The Central Asian geopolitical space has been undergoing a tectonic change in recent years. This is happening primarily because of the broader geopolitical developments which are taking place in this region. In this regard, the first and foremost was the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, which largely altered the geopolitical space of post-Soviet Eurasia. This has happened because Russia’s War with Ukraine and the subsequent West’s sanctions on Russia hinder the Central Asian countries from engaging more with Moscow. The Central Asian countries also fear that Russia might carry out similar actions against them as happened to Ukraine as part of its “Greater Eurasia” dream. The apprehension is more visible in Kazakhstan, as it has a long border with Russia. Kazakhstan is also taking an independent position in the current Russia-Ukraine War. At the same time, the United States is also not taking much interest in Central Asia after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Secondly, the political development in Afghanistan is also going to have immense geopolitical consequences for Central Asia. Hence, one witnesses some form of the geopolitical vacuum also taking place in Central Asia largely due to recent geopolitical trajectories, as discussed above.
However, one interesting development which is taking place in this part of the world, largely unnoticed in the recent past, is the growing influence of Turkey in Central Asia. This can be witnessed from several agreements Turkey has signed with Central Asian countries to revive the imaginary geopolitical idea of the “Turkic world”. Though some of these agreements which the Central Asian countries have signed with Turkey, in the longer run, will have a boomerang effect on the Central Asian geopolitical space. It can be argued that throughout history, Turkey tried to expand its geopolitical spheres of influence in this heartland by employing coercive means. In this context, one may highlight here that in the historical past, Central Asia was a space for competition among three major powers – the Persian empire, Turkish (Ottoman) power and Tsarist Russia- which shaped the destiny of this geopolitical space, also known as Turkestan.
Some of the major initiatives in Central Asia in recent years include the “Uzbekistan Military Agreement” in November 2022, the conclusion of the summit of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) at Samarkand in November 2022 and the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan Summit in December 2022. Similarly, President Erdogan also visited Kazakhstan in October 2022. Turkey’s initiatives in Central Asia are raising many apprehensions about whether Ankara is trying to expand its strategic influence in this region, taking advantage of its vulnerability.
It is a fact that Central Asian countries, particularly energy-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, depend heavily on Turkey to export their energy into the international market. At the same time, in the initial years of post-1991, many strategic experts argued that Turkey acted as a “proxy” for the United States in Central Asia. The leaders of Central Asia in the post-1991 phase also tried to emulate the Turkish model in their respective countries (except Tajikistan), especially in the political and economic sphere. The Turkish model, especially of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who stood for the separation of religion and politics and the modernisation of Turkish politics, inspired Central Asian political elites at the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, the Central Asian leaders also took steps for positive engagement with Turkey.
However, the growing radicalisation of the Turkish political system, especially after the accession to power by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan since 2002, first as Prime Minister of Turkey and since 2014 as President, has dented Turkey’s image as a secular country. This development has an impact on Central Asia also as the Central Asian political elites look towards Turkey suspiciously. Over the years, Erdogan and his party used political Islam to mobilise the masses and consolidate his hold over the country’s domestic policy. This is despite the fact that the economy of Turkey has been dwindling over the years. Turkey’s location as a strategic vantage point over the years, as a transit point for the export of both Russian and Caspian energy, is the only consolable point as Ankara is getting much of the transit fees. At the same time, the desire on the part of President Erdogan to be the “New Caliphate” and to dominate the Muslim world has also propelled him to use religion as an effective tool for its foreign policy to overture a reminiscence of the “Ottoman Legacy”. It may be noted that over the years, Turkey drew heavy flak for its role in the Syrian crisis and meddling in Cyprus. An article written by W. Robert Pearson and Gregory Kist titled “Turkey’s dangerous dance with radicalism” provides insight into the dangerous drift of domestic and foreign policy under the Erdogan regime. The article argues that Erdogan, to radicalise Turkish society, supported the “Millî Görüş Islamist movement” which “has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood”. The article further argues that Erdogan promoted massive radicalisation in Turkish society.
Similarly, another article titled “The Trouble With Erdogan, Isis, And The Kurds”, written by Michael J. Totten and published in World Affairs in 2015 concurs with the view of Pearson. In this article, quoting Newsweek, Totten writes, “ISIS saw the Turkish army as its ally” (p.9). Similarly, Colin P. Clarke and Ahmet S. Yayla’s article “Erdogan’s Fatal Blind Spot” published in Foreign Policy in 2016 also proves the nature of collusion between the Erdogan regime with the radical terrorist group ISIS. The article by Collin P. Clarke and Ahmet S. Yayala highlights that “Turkey has been accused of recruiting thousands of former Islamic State fighters to attack Kurds in Syria”. The article further highlights “it was revealed that the group [ISIS] had established robust terrorist cells. There are two types of cell structures: those composed of Turks and those manned by foreign fighters. The foreign fighter cells primarily consist of militants from the Caucasus, Uighur Turks from China, and Central Asians from the former Soviet Union, as well as fleeing Arab and European Islamic State fighters”.
Some of the above studies reveal the true colour and intent of the Erdogan regime. Turkey under Erdogan is interested more in promoting instability by providing covert support to radical and terrorist groups in and around West Asia, South Asia and former post-Soviet space to achieve its narrower geopolitical goals. Turkey’s role in Central Asia needs to be critically analysed in this background. Though Turkey is one of the largest investors in Central Asia, the cause of concern is the growing patronage being provided by Ankara to the Central Asian radical and terrorist groups. As reported, in 2016, the banned Central Asian terror group Hizbut Tahrir al Islami (HTI) organised conferences in Ankara and Istanbul to recreate the “Caliphate”. Bayram Balci, a Turkish scholar, in a research paper titled “Turkey’s Religious Outreach in Central Asia and the Caucasus” published in 2014 by Carnegie, argues that “In recent years, the AK Party (AKP) and its leaders Recep Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu have redoubled international religious outreach to the wider Turkish world”. Balci further argues that the Turkish leadership chose educational training as a medium to expand their outreach in the Central Asian countries. However, under the leadership of the late Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan took stern measures to curb religious activities, as Balci’s study suggests. The Erdogan regime used religious radicalisation and provided support to Central Asian terror groups like Hizbut Tahrir al Islami as a tool to expand Ankara’s sphere of influence in Central Asia. This can be evident from the fact that in 2016, Erdogan supported a series of congregations of Hizbut Tahrir al Islami in Turkey as part of the radicalisation of Central Asian space. As studies suggest, many active Central Asian Hizbut Tahrir cadres participated in these congregations. This shows that Turkey is keen to expand its sphere of influence in Central Asia by employing radicalisation.
The radical terrorist group ISIS also recruited cadres from Central Asia for its operation in Syria, as studies suggest. This is a reflection of the growing radicalisation of Central Asia in recent years. Kazakhstan was largely free from radicalisation in the 1990s and, at the beginning of 2000, slowly became the hotbed of radical activities and as studies suggest, several Kazakh youths also joined the terrorist group ISIS. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that post-2011, Kazakhstan has been facing an onslaught from radical and terrorist groups.
The Central Asian countries are also quite opposed to the imposition of Turkic culture in the Central Asian region. As reported, in Uzbekistan, the government banned a Turkish soap opera for hurting the sentiments of the local population in 2019. A similar measure was undertaken by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan when these countries banned Turkish soap operas. It is pertinent to highlight that the Central Asian countries are pretty apprehensive of Turkey’s role in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Turkey, along with Pakistan, played the religious card while supporting Azerbaijan, as a result of which a greater degree of radicalisation is taking place both in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus region.
The Central Asian countries are also quite apprehensive of the unholy nexus between Turkey and Pakistan. It is a fact that Turkey, China and Pakistan are patronising radicals and terrorist forces, thus posing a severe threat to the regional security of Central Asia and South Asia.
Another critical aspect that needs closer attention is that Iran occupies a vital position in the geopolitical space of post-Soviet Eurasia. The Central Asian countries are keen to end their isolation and join the connectivity project through Iran. However, growing Turkish engagement in Central Asia may generate apprehension from Iran. As it is a fact that both Iran and Turkey are the traditional rivals in the Central Asian space. The plan for the future of the “Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor” which Turkey plans to connect with Uzbekistan through Azerbaijan may further isolate Uzbekistan in the regional connectivity project through Iran. The same is true for other Central Asian countries.
Another point that needs to be underlined here is that Russia is also quite apprehensive about Turkey’s move to Central Asia. In this regard, the formation of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) has not been well received by Russian policy analysts who perceive that Turkey might make inroads into Central Asian geopolitics. However, war with Ukraine is a priority point for Russian policymakers at the moment; however, Moscow cannot afford to lose Central Asia’s geopolitical space. The intervention by Russia through CSTO in Kazakhstan to bring normalcy is a pointer in this direction. Though Russia, in recent months, is feeling the heat from the growing resentment in Central Asia primarily due to the Russia-Ukraine War.
What needs to be underlined here is that Turkey’s imperial motive in the framework of the “neo-Ottoman” legacy has been relatively clearer in recent years. At the same time, the Central Asian countries’ engagement with Turkey will also backfire as Ankara is more interested in making this Central Asian geopolitical space its playfield for the “imaginary Turkic world”.
In this context, there is a need for greater cooperation among India, Iran and Central Asian countries, especially in the field of connectivity. As discussed above, the Central Asian countries are keen to join the connectivity project through Iran. In this context, Central Asian countries are also showing keen interest in joining the Chahbahar project initiated by India in Iran, though current political development in Afghanistan is becoming a stumbling block in this regard. However, the recently concluded high-level meeting on 6 December 2022 of the “First India-Central Asia Meeting of National Security Advisers/Secretaries of the Security Council” strongly underlined the significance of Chahbahar, as it highlighted “the important role that Chabahar Port played during the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and its immense potential in enhancing trade and connectivity, as well as the logistics infrastructure of the Central Asian countries in the delivery of humanitarian goods to the Afghan people by international organisations. The participants supported India’s proposal to include the Chabahar port within the framework of the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC)”.
The Chahbahar Port promoted by India will provide a better outlet to Central Asian countries in terms of their external engagement. Similarly, if the Chabahar port connects with INSTC, it will be a game-changer for Central Asian countries in terms of reaching the wider market. In the longer run, this can facilitate their future engagement with the Indo-Pacific corridor, as studies suggest.
In a nutshell, it can be highlighted that Central Asian countries, while engaging with Turkey, will face greater isolation in the international community. In this context, these five “stans” of Central Asia should employ their diplomatic move carefully.
The author teaches at the School of International Studies, JNU. Views are personal.
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