WikiLeaks Cablegate: Difficult to convince Pakistan on counter-insurgency
WikiLeaks Cablegate: Difficult to convince Pakistan on counter-insurgency
India-related document from the leaked US embassy cables released by whistleblowing website WikiLeaks.

Reference ID: 09SANTIAGO324

Created: 2009-04-03 22:10

Released: 2010-11-30 21:09

Classification: SECRET

Origin: Embassy Santiago

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 000324

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019

TAGS: OVIP BIDEN JOSEPH PREL ECON PGOV SOCI UK PK

AF

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 27 MEETING WITH

BRITISH PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN

SANTIAGO 00000324 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Simons for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (U) March 28, 2009; 8:30 am; Vina del Mar, Chile.

¶2. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Joseph Biden, Vice President

Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor to the

Vice President

Brian McKeon, Deputy National Security Advisor to

the Vice President

Brian Harris (notetaker), Political/Economic

Officer, U.S. Embassy Guatemala City

United Kingdom

Gordon Brown, Prime Minister

Thomas Fletcher, Private Secretary to the Prime

Minister

Stuart Wood, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister

Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for

International Development

¶3. (C) Summary: During a bilateral meeting on the margins

of the Progressive Governance Leaders Summit in Chile, Vice

President Joseph Biden and British Prime Minister Gordon

Brown discussed the economic crisis in terms of the upcoming

G-20 Summit and Afghanistan and Pakistan. On economic

issues, Brown pressed Vice President Biden to push the

Germans to move forward with $ 250 billion in special drawing

rights (SDRs) for the IMF, to use IMF gold sales to support

poorest countries and to take the initiative to restart

sectoral negotiations related to Doha. On Pakistan and

Afghanistan, Vice President Biden noted our increased troop

commitment to Afghanistan and the need to lower expectations

as to what is achievable in Afghanistan given enormous

governance issues. End Summary.

-------------------------

TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

-------------------------

¶4. (C) PM Brown opened the meeting by thanking Vice

President Biden for recent statement on revising the

supervisory structure for the G-20.

¶5. (C) Vice President Biden asked whether capital flight

from developing countries would be high on the G-20 agenda

and noted that Argentinean President Fernandez has requested

additional assistance without the usual IMF conditionality.

Brown responded that he was worried about capital flight,

particularly in Eastern Europe. The current financial crisis

will test whether Eastern European nations have developed

sufficiently strong institutions since the fall of communism

to withstand the downturn politically and socially as well as

economically. It is a test of whether freedom can be

successfully combined with economic stability. IMF

conditionality has long been an area of contention for Latin

America and it is not surprising that Argentina would ask for

preventative funds without conditions.

------------------------------

BROWN PRESSES ON IMF AND TRADE

------------------------------

¶6. (C) Prime Minister Brown delivered several requests on

economic issues to Vice President Biden. The first was the

need to secure financing for an additional $ 250 billion in

Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for the IMF to help vulnerable

economies withstand the economic downturn. Brown commented

that his understanding was this was an amount that the

administration could support without the need to consult

Congress. U.S. support on the issue would be particularly

helpful with the Germans who, as yet, do not support

additional SDRs. Parallel discussions were going on with

China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and several other Gulf nations to

secure $ 400 billion in additional financing. Rapid approval

of the IMF portion would help catalyze these parallel

negotiations.

¶7. (C) PM Brown also noted that the IMF was being forced to

sell gold to raise funds to pay its administrative staff.

There had been far fewer loan programs this decade than in

the 1990s. The result was reduced revenue from countries

repaying loans and a consequent budget shortfall. There is a

SANTIAGO 00000324 002.2 OF 003

pending sale of $ 11 billion in IMF gold that should be used

to help the poorest countries rather than pay IMF staff. The

U.S. position had been that interest from gold reserves could

be devoted to IMF programs, but that capital sales should

not. PM Brown asked Vice President Biden to reconsider this

position.

¶8. (C) PM Brown said successfully concluding the Doha round

would be difficult but the Obama administration should agree

to deal with environmental and labor commitments outside the

formal trading framework in relevant institutions such as the

ILO. Brown suggested that if the United States allowed

resumption of the next round of sectoral discussions, it

would create momentum for the rest of the world, including

India, to re-engage in the discussions. Opening new sectoral

discussions on Doha would garner the Administration

international support without needing to make difficult

political compromises or commitments for the time being.

¶9. (C) UK Secretary of State for International Development

Douglas Alexander said it was important to find a way to move

forward on the Doha Agreement. Trade discussions are like

riding a bike, i.e., you have to keep moving forward or you

fall down. If we do not proactively move forward and

eventually come to a successful conclusion to the Doha round,

the United States could be blamed in some quarters. The Doha

round was meant to be the &development8 round of

negotiations with significant aid from donor nations

contingent upon the agreement's successful conclusion. If it

did not pass, some governments that stand to lose aid, such

as Brazil, would likely blame the United States.

¶10. (C) Vice President Biden did not commit on any of these

issues but noted that labor interests in the United States

were not satisfied and were looking to the Administration to

establish its labor &bona fides.8 In a year, he said,

movement on economic and trade issues would either be easier

or impossible depending on the direction of the world

economy.

--------------------

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

--------------------

¶11. (C) Turning to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vice President

Biden described the importance of combating terrorism and

noted the different elements of the Obama administration's

policy. First, the focus in Afghanistan is on Al Qaida. The

Obama administration will not make an open-ended commitment

to building freedom and democracy in Afghanistan because it

is not realistic. Second, there is no real possibility of

defeating Al Qaida without also dealing with Pakistan.

Third, he recognized that the United States cannot solve the

problem on its own. The whole world needed to engage.

¶12. (C) Vice President Biden said he worried that NATO

countries in Europe underestimated the threat from the region

and viewed the problem as an economic development issue

rather than a security issue, despite the fact that Afghan

opium is primarily exported to Europe and Europe has been the

victim of several terrorist attacks originating from the

region. Vice President Biden described the complex nature of

the security problem in Afghanistan, commenting that

&besides the demography, geography and history of the

region, we have a lot going for us.8

¶13. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the current U.S.

commitment of 63,000 troops to Afghanistan is the result of a

vigorous internal policy debate and would not be sustainable

politically for more than two years without visible signs of

progress. After two years, the extraordinary cost of

maintaining a robust military presence in Afghanistan would

make additional commitment increasingly difficult. After

Afghan elections the Administration intends to review the

situation again. Currently there is little capacity for the

Afghan government to execute many of the functions of

government. In many areas of the country, local officials

have close to no knowledge of how to govern or even basic

knowledge of payroll or budget. Part of the reason the

Taliban is strengthening is since the Taliban has the local

capacity to settle basic disputes quickly while central

government courts can take six to eight months to process a

case.

¶14. (C) The idea of a strong rule of law under a centralized

SANTIAGO 00000324 003.2 OF 003

Karzai government was not realistic. New policy towards the

Taliban should reflect the reality of the Afghan government's

lack of capacity. Our policy should first aim to stabilize

the urban areas and surrounding rural communities and then

seek to exploit divisions within the Taliban, co-opting

moderate elements rather than simply defeating militarily all

elements of the Taliban.

¶15. (C) On Pakistan, Vice President Biden commented that it

was difficult to convince Pakistan to commit to developing

its counter-insurgency potential. The threat from India

leads Pakistan to devote the bulk of its defense spending to

conventional warfare capabilities. However, something must

be done in the meantime. We need to develop our relationship

with Pakistan beyond its current transactional nature to a

long-term strategic partnership. We should begin with $ 1.5

billion per year in economic assistance that is unconditional

and supplement that with military assistance that is

conditioned on the modernization of its command structure and

active action in the field to combat insurgents. It would be

difficult to convince Congress to support such a plan,

particularly the unconditional civilian component.

¶16. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the United States

wants to empower the UN and wants active European

participation in resolving the threats in Pakistan and

Afghanistan. With the exception of the UK and a few others,

very few Europeans are taking action. Germany completely

dropped the ball on police training but NATO countries should

continue to provide assistance that is within their capacity

to deliver.

¶17. (C) Brown agreed that there was a significant terrorist

threat emanating from the region. More than 30,000

Pakistanis travel back and forth to the UK each year and

two-thirds of the terrorist threats that UK security forces

investigate originate in Pakistan -- including one on-going

investigation. The roots of terrorism in Pakistan are

complicated and go beyond the madrasas to, in some areas, a

complete societal incitement to militancy. Zedari's

commitment to combating terrorism is unclear, although he

always says the right things.

¶18. (C) Brown agreed on the need for a shared commitment and

noted that the only way to reduce the threat and eventually

draw down NATO's commitment to the region was by increasing

the capacity of Afghanistani and Pakistani security services.

Dividing the Taliban would greatly reduce its effectiveness,

though doing this made the Iraq problem look easy by

comparison.

¶19. (S) Vice President Biden commented that Zedari had told

him two months ago that ISI director &Kiyani will take me

out.8 Brown thought this unlikely and said that Kiyani did

not want to be another Musharraf, rather he would give

civilian leadership scope to function. However, he was wary

of the Sharif brothers and Zedari.

¶20. (U) The Office of the Vice President cleared this

message.

SIMONS

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